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Conflict between Democrats and Republicans is a central component of the contemporary 
American political system. Negative feelings and discrimination based on political 
orientation are at an all-time high, leading otherwise similar Americans to deeply distrust 
one another. Social identity theory provides a framework for not only understanding how 
this distrust between partisans persists, but how it may be negated. This study builds on 
recent work on moral judgments and trust games to create situations to increase trust 
across party lines. Using an online-experimental design, this study investigates the effects 
of two types of moral judgments on trust building: 1) moral judgments characterized by 
consensus, where agreement is expected for most Americans (e.g. cheating is bad), and 2) 
moral judgments characterized by dissensus, where there is a large amount of 
disagreement across party lines (e.g. abortion rights). This experiment uses a 2 (political 
group: same or different) x 4 (moral stance: pro-life, pro-choice, universal, or control) 
design, which allows me to explore how the effects of moral disagreement differ for 
ingroup members versus outgroup members. Results from this study will be presented 
and future directions will be discussed for improving political discourse and generalizing 
interpersonal trust to a group-level.
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Introduction 
Political partisanship and animosity in American politics are the highest they have 
been in decades (Pew 2016). Americans are becoming increasingly polarized in their 
political views (Pew 2016) and implicit prejudice against the opposing party has grown to 
higher levels than implicit racial biases (Iyengar and Westwood 2014). This prejudice 
creates distrust between Americans who hold different political identities, which, in turn, 
leads to less cooperation between Democrats and Republicans (Carlin & Love 2011; 
Andris et al. 2015). One explanation for the trust gap is the underlying differences 
between Democrats and Republicans, including on core demographic dimensions (Taylor 
2016), personality traits (Jost, et al. 2003; Pratto, et al. 1994), and moral foundations 
(Miles and Vaisey 2015). These differences are amplified by the tendency for people to 
view other groups as more extreme and ideological than their own, a tendency shown in 
both political and non-political groups (Krislov and Kiley 2016). Below, I develop 
hypotheses to explain the distrust between partisans and propose a mechanism to promote 
cooperation between political rivals. I then test the hypotheses in an experimental setting 
and end with a discussion of my future research agenda. 
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Chapter 1: Theoretical Background 
Social Identity Theory 
To explain distrust between members of different political parties, I first turn to a 
well-documented phenomenon in social psychology: ingroup favoritism (Chen and Li, 
2009; Hewstone et al. 2002; Tajfel, 1982). As the name suggests, social identity theory 
describes the tendency for people to favor others who they believe belong to the same 
social groups as them. Tajfel (1971) first demonstrated the power of ingroup favoritism 
using experimentally-created “minimal groups” and went on to develop social identity 
theory (SIT) to explain his findings (Tajfel and Turner 1979). SIT states that once people 
identify themselves as belonging to a group, it becomes important to their self-concept 
and a basis on which they define themselves.  
SIT argues that individuals organize their world into social groups via a 3-step 
process. First, people automatically sort things, including themselves and other people, 
into categories to more easily understand them. For instance, people subconsciously 
categorize others by their race, gender, and age group in milliseconds (Contreras, Banaji 
and Mitchell 2013). The second step, social identification, is where individuals move 
from categorizing others to categorizing themselves. In this stage, people’s social 
identities become important to their concept of self and they start defining themselves 
according to their group or category memberships. These social groups can exist 
naturally outside the lab (e.g. gender, race, religion, political orientation) (Bernhard et al., 
2006; Bouckaert and Dhaene, 2004; Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001) or be created in 
3 
experimental settings (Eckel and Grossman, 2005; Chen and Li, 2009; Guala et al., 
2013). For instance, a person can come to think of themselves as a “mother” or a 
“vegan.”. 
The last stage, social comparison, is where members compare their group to other 
groups. These comparisons are done with the intention of viewing their group as superior, 
known as ingroup favoritism or ingroup bias (Brewer 1999). Through this process, 
members teach one another how to act in accordance with the group’s values and people 
begin to internalize the group’s norms as their own. Studies consistently find that people 
prefer their ingroup over the outgroup. This results in individuals giving ingroup 
members more positive evaluations (Brewer, 1979; LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Mullen, 
Brown, & Smith, 1992; Perdue et al., 1990), larger rewards (Tajfel et al., 1971), and 
being more motivated to work with ingroup – versus outgroup -- members (Ellemers, De 
Gilder, & Haslam, 2004; Worchel et al., 1998). This phenomenon has been shown to be 
powerful enough to override preexisting friendships in laboratory studies (Ahmed 2007). 
One key effect of ingroup favoritism is a heightened tendency to extend trust to, and 
cooperate with, ingroup members (Ahmed, 2007; Brewer, 1999; Dawes, van de Kragt, 
and Orbell, 1988; Irwin, Mcgrimmon, and Simpson 2008; Simpson 2006; Kramer, 
Brewer, and Hanna, 1995).  
An important question regarding ingroup favoritism is whether the previously 
mentioned positive effects for members (ingroup love) is accompanied by similar 
negative effects for non-members (outgroup hate). There is a longstanding debate 
concerning what conditions lead to outgroup hate vs ingroup love, and the two are often 
hard to disentangle empirically. While Sumner (1906) argued that the two mechanisms 
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are directly linked, Allport (1954) later pushed back on the claim. Allport argued that 
ingroup favoritism need not include degradation of the outgroup. In an attempt to settle 
the debate, Brewer (1999) looked at forty years of psychological data and found that the 
link between ingroup love and outgroup hate depends on the structure of the society the 
groups exist in. Specifically, she points to constant competition and a zero-sum 
perspective. 
The American political system’s design is characterized by the conditions Brewer 
outlines. There is constant competition between Democrats and Republicans in modern-
day America with 24/7 political news cycles and the average political campaign length 
increasing each year (Grosz 2019). The competition between groups also entails zero sum 
gains.  This means that one group’s success is tied to the failure of the opposing group 
(Porter and Kramer 2006). For example, the number of Republicans in congress is 
inversely related to the number of non-Republicans (Democrats and Independents). A 
few third-party candidates notwithstanding, for one to increase, the other typically must 
decrease. Therefore, opposing political identities represent competition, leading to 
outgroup hate and distrust between partisans (Brewer 1999; Brewer and Campbell 1976; 
Tajfel et al. 1971).  
So far, only positive aspects of shared group membership have been discussed. 
However, being a fellow group member comes with higher expectations and pressures to 
conform to the group’s ideals (Marques et al. 1988; Marques et al. 1994; Gaertner et al. 
2011). When a member fails to meet those ideals or deviates from the group’s goals, they 
are subject to harsher punishments than outgroup members (Coull et al. 2001; Khan and 
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Lambert 2010). The Black Sheep Hypothesis (BSH) builds on the assumptions of SIT and 
explains why this occurs (Marques, Yzerbyt and Leyens 1988). 
The ‘Black Sheep Hypothesis’ 
BSH asserts that frequent interactions lead members to have more complex and 
nuanced views of their own group and, inversely, the lack of contact with outgroup 
members leads people to exaggerate the outgroup’s homogeneity. This is compounded by 
the fact that people more extensively use cognitive shortcuts such as stereotypes when 
evaluating outgroup members (Marques and Paez, 1994; Ouwerkerk 2005; Sayans-
Jimenez et al. 2017). According to the BSH, agreement or disagreement with ingroup 
members will matter more than agreement or disagreement with outgroup members. In 
addition to the different amounts of attention paid to disagreement, people punish their 
fellow ingroup members more harshly because they have higher expectations for them 
(Balliet and Van Lange, 2013; Mendoza, Lane, and Amodio, 2014). Therefore, the 
amplified effects of ingroup disagreement result from the surprise that ingroup 
disagreement creates. Lastly, deviant ingroup members (or black sheep) are seen as a 
larger threat to the ingroup than are outgroup members. They have more influence over 
fellow members than outsiders and their existence indicates that the group’s values may 
be weaker than those of the outgroup, who are assumed to be homogeneous in their 
beliefs (Linville, Salovey, and Fischer, 1986; Meissner & Brigham, 2001; Ostrom and 
Sedikides, 1992).  
The Moral Judgements Hypothesis 
The last theory used in this paper is, in a sense, the inverse of the black sheep 
hypothesis. While the BSH explains how ingroup disagreements can counteract ingroup 
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love, the moral judgements hypothesis (MJH) explains how outgroup agreements can 
counteract outgroup hate. 
Recently, social scientists have begun looking at morality and its role in 
producing cooperation between individuals in situations requiring trust and 
trustworthiness. The focus has been on two main factors: (1) the motivation to view 
oneself as moral (Mazar, Amir, and Ariely 2008; Aquino and Reed 2002) and (2) the 
desire to be seen as moral by others (Feinberg, Willer, and Schultz 2014; Wu, Balliet, 
and Van Lange 2015). Simpson, Harrell, and Willer (2013) found that randomly 
assigning participants to take a stance on a moral issue (e.g. cheating is bad) led them to 
think of themselves as more moral and to act more trustworthy in economic games 
compared to a control group. Additionally, observing another take a moral stance led 
people to view the stance-taker as more trustworthy and prefer them as partners in these 
games (Everett, Pizarro, and Crockett 2016; Simpson, Harrell, and Willer 2013; Simpson, 
Willer, and Harrell 2017;).  
While research on the moral judgment hypothesis highlights the importance of 
moral stance-taking, it has thus far focused solely on moral stances that are characterized 
by a high level of consensus, or agreement about what is right or wrong (e.g. arguments 
against cheating or plagiarism on college campuses). Polarizing morals, like those that 
characterize political disagreements (e.g., abortion), have not been investigated. The 
authors do hypothesize that ingroup status and agreement will moderate the effect of a 
moral stance when moral consensus is low (e.g. abortion, same-sex marriage, gun rights). 
This project extends the findings of the MJH by testing the predictions on polarizing 
moral arguments. Additionally, it examines how group membership, both ingroup love 
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and outgroup hate, interacts with moral stances to promote trust and cooperation between 
outgroup members. 
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Chapter 2: Hypotheses 
Derived from SIT, I expect people to have more positive views of ingroup members, 
all else equal. 
Hypothesis 1: When no moral stance is taken, individuals will perceive ingroup 
members as more moral and trustworthy than outgroup members. 
The moral judgements hypothesis (MJH) predicts that agreement will moderate the 
effect of a moral stance on ratings of trustworthiness. 
Hypothesis 2a: Individuals will perceive stance takers they agree with as more moral 
and trustworthy than those who do not take a moral stance. 
Hypothesis 2b: Individuals will perceive stance takers they disagree with as less 
moral and trustworthy than those who do not take a moral stance. 
A conceptual model showing predictions from SIT and MJH is given in Fig. 2.1. The 
model shows how ingroup bias (following SIT) and shared morals (following the MJH) 
are predicted to each increase positive interpersonal attitudes, which will in turn increase 
trust. 
While H1 reflects SIT’s predictions for ingroup love and outgroup hate, the black 
sheep hypothesis predicts that moral disagreement will lead to more negative views of 
ingroup members, which will counteract the effects of ingroup love. 
Hypothesis 3: Moral disagreements will have a larger negative effect on perceptions 
of ingroup members than outgroup members. 
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Fig. 2.1: Conceptual Model 
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It is important to note that H3 refers to the size of the effect and not the overall 
outcome since ingroup members have higher baseline ratings compared to outgroup 
members according to H1.  
H1 can be thought of as a baseline. When no moral stances are being taken, in this 
study the control conditions, H1 predicts ingroup favoritism to occur. H3 predicts that the 
size of the moral disagreement effect will be larger for ingroup members. Lastly, H2 is 
split into two separate hypotheses to compare the effects that moral agreement (a) versus 
disagreement (b) have on feelings towards the stance-taker.  
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Chapter 3: Methods 
Recruitment and sample information 
Participants were recruited through Prolific Academic, an online database of adult 
workers who complete online tasks on a wide variety of topics (Peer et al. 2017). The 
sample consisted of 48% females, 53% Republicans, with a mean age of 35. See Table 
3.1 for a more detailed description of the sample demographics. 
Procedures 
After opening the study on Prolific’s task page, participants were redirected to a 
Qualtrics survey. Participants were told that the purpose of the study was to make quick 
judgements about others based on short paragraphs and limited information. After 
agreeing to participate, participants provided basic demographic information about 
themselves including gender, age, race, education, and political orientation.  
Next, participants were asked to write a short paragraph about their views on one 
of four topics, depending on condition. The study uses a 2 (political group: same or 
different) x 4 (morals: pro-life, pro-choice, universal, or control) design. After writing 
their own paragraph, participants read a paragraph ostensibly written by a (fictitious) 
person with whom they were paired. Participants either read a pro-life argument 
(conservative morals), a pro-choice argument (liberal morals), an anti-cheating argument 
(moral universal), or a restaurant review (control, no moral). The writing prompts always 
matched the reading prompts, so participants read a paragraph responding to the same 
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White  332 (77.39%) 
Black 18 (4.20%) 
Latinx 19 (4.43%) 
Asian 22 (5.13%) 
Other 38 (8.86%) 
Gender 
 
Male 222 (51.99%) 
Female 205 (48.01%) 
Age 
 
      Min 18 
      Max 73 
Education  
     <HS 6     (1.4%) 
     High School 58   (13.5%) 
    Some College 101 (23.5%) 
     2-year Degree 33    (7.7%) 
     4-year Degree 154  (35.9%) 
     M.A. 59     (13.8%) 
     PhD. 18     (4.20%) 
Region  
     Northeast 98   (22.8%) 
     Midwest 95   (22.1%) 
     South 166 (38.7%) 
     West 70    (16.3%) 
Income  
     <$15k 40       (6.3%) 
     $15k-$30k 100     (15.8%) 
     $30k-45k 98       (15.5%) 
     $45k-$60k 104     (16.5%) 
     $60k-$75k 80       (12.7%) 
     $75k-$90k 53       (8.4%) 
     $90k-$105k 40       (6.3%) 
     $105k-$120k 37       (5.9%) 
     $120k+ 80       (12.7%) 
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prompt they had just written about. Participants were also told their partner’s political 
orientation (Democrat or Republican) and region of residence. 
The region of residence served as an attention check to ensure participants read 
the passages carefully and remembered their partner’s demographics. Additionally, it was 
included to ensure that political orientation was not the sole piece of information given. 
This made it more difficult for participants to discover the purpose of the study. Lastly, 
the partner’s region was set as Midwest due to its political diversity. This avoided 
unintended interactions between the region and political orientation that may have 
occurred with examples such as “a liberal from the South” or “a conservative from the 
West Coast.”  
After reading the prompt, participants were asked two manipulation check 
questions (“What was the paragraph you just read about?” and “Was the author a 
Democrat or a Republican?”) as well as a comprehension check (“What region was the 
author from?”) Comprehension rates were high, with 97% of participants answering all 
the checks correctly. 
After the reading and writing portion of the study, participants took part in a token 
allocation task, specifically a one-shot trust game. Then, they answered questions about 
their feelings towards their own political group and the opposing political group to gauge 
attitudes towards the groups as a whole. Afterwards, participants were debriefed about 




Agreement and disagreement with a moral stance 
 After reading the prompt, participants answered a 7-point Likert scale in response 
to the question, “How much do you agree with the other participant’s opinion?” The scale 
ranged from strongly disagree to strongly agree. The above scale was split into two 
separate measures, one for agree and the other for disagree. This split was necessary in 
order to compare the effects of agreement and disagreement on attitudinal and behavioral 
trust.  
This study measured agreement on two types of moral stances: those with high 
levels of consensus and those with low levels of consensus. Following Simpson et al. 
(2013), the high consensus condition used an argument against cheating on college 
exams. The low consensus condition contained one of two arguments either in support or 
against abortion. To ensure realism, I visited multiple online forums and editorials to see 
the talking points and argument styles of each side. I then wrote a prompt for each side 
that reflected the reoccurring themes. The prompts were pilot tested to ensure they 
sounded authentic and no participants mentioned the prompt’s writing style as reasons for 
suspicion.  
Attitudes 
Attitudinal trust is modeled as an index of 6 indicators: liking, trustworthy, 
responsible, moral, selfish, fairness. Except for liking, the question text was the same for 
all the measures. Participants were asked “How ____ do you think the other participant 
is, in general?” and each of the measures were paired with a 1-7 Likert scale For liking, 
participants were asked “How much do you like the other participant?” The 6 indicators 
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had a very high interitem reliability (0.94). The models used were also run using the 
indicators individually, rather than as a scale and the main findings remained unchanged. 
Behavioral Trust 
My measure of trust used a standard 2-person trust dilemma, also called an 
investment game (Kuwabara 2011; Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe 1995; Buchan, Croson 
and Dawes 2002). In this decision scenario, participants were assigned the role of Sender 
and given 10 tokens, each worth $0.03. As the Sender they could send 0-10 tokens to the 
other participant who was the Receiver. Any tokens sent by the Sender were tripled 
before given to the Receiver. Any tokens not sent were added to their point total at the 
end of the round. The Receiver then chose how many of the tokens to return to the Sender 
and the round is over. The number of tokens participants chose to send to the Receiver is 
the behavioral measure of trust in this study. Participants were told they would learn how 
many tokens were returned to them at the end of the study. I did not measure partner’s 
trustworthiness, as it was outside the scope of this research.  
Political Orientation 
I measured political orientation in three ways. First, participants reported how 
they think of themselves politically (Democrat, Republican, Independent, or Other). 
Next, using 7-point Likert scales, participants described how liberal/conservative they 
view themselves both socially and economically. Lastly, I measured who participants 
voted for in the 2016 presidential election and how enthusiastic they were about their 
candidate of choice. These additional measures of political orientation allow for models 
to investigate how political extremism acts as a moderator on the impact of ingroup bias 
on attitudes (discussed more below).  
16 
Additional Variables of Interest 
I expect the strength of one’s party affiliation to moderate the effect of in-group 
bias on trust and cooperation. Specifically, the more extreme liberals or conservatives 
should show the most ingroup love and outgroup hate. Since this study includes two 
measures of trust, behavioral and attitudinal, I model how attitudes mediate the effect of 
group status and moral agreement on behavioral trust. I expect ingroup status and moral 
agreement will increase attitudinal trust, which will lead to more behavioral trust. 
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Chapter 4: Results 
Level of consensus  
 Before testing the hypotheses, it is important to see if the level of consensus 
around an argument alters the effect of agreement on either attitudinal or behavioral trust. 
The first column of Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 labelled ‘Consensus Check’ show no 
difference on the level of consensus for either attitudinal or behavioral trust. The non-
significant consensus coefficient shows that agreement with a moral stance has the same 
positive effect on trustworthiness ratings regardless of whether the stance taken is an 
abortion argument or an anti-cheating argument. Again, the level of consensus of the 
moral stance has no direct or indirect effect on behavioral trust. Based on these results, 
the following analyses look at agreement regardless of whether it was in the low or high 
consensus conditions.  
Hypothesis-testing for attitudes 
I use multivariate regression to test my hypotheses for two reasons; first, it allows 
me to analyze how my continuous independent variables function along a spectrum, 
rather than only using experimental conditions as indicators. For example, I analyze H2a 
and H2b to see how the degree of agreement or disagreement affects attitude ratings of 
stance takers (e.g. the more a person agrees with a stance, the higher they rate the stance 
taker). This has the added benefit of accounting for partisans with more moderate beliefs. 
Under the regression framework, a person who only moderately agrees with a moral 
stance is predicted to rate the stance taker less trustworthy and moral than a participant 
who strongly agrees with the moral stance. This linear effect would be categorized as 
18 













Same Party 0.039 0.812*** 0.151 0.100 0.077 
 (0.12) (0.30) (0.19) (0.16) (0.17) 
 
Female 0.085 0.035 0.186 0.086 0.193 
 (0.11) (0.26) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) 
 
Nonwhite -0.150 -0.186 -0.163 -0.155 -0.173 
 (0.13) (0.31) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15) 
 
Republican 0.234 0.287 0.207 0.309 0.212 
 (0.12) (0.32) (0.21) (0.17) (0.18) 
 
Disagree   -0.800***  -0.850*** 
   (0.08)  (0.05) 
 
Agree 0.826***   0.824***  
 (0.05)   (0.04)  
 
Same Party * Rep 
 
 -0.022 -0.136 -0.015 
   (0.25) (0.23) (0.25) 
 





 -0.100   
   (0.11)   
High Consensus 
(0/1) 0.041     
 (0.12)     
      
 
Constant 3.53*** 4.55*** 5.46*** 3.54*** 5.49*** 
 (0.17) (0.36) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) 
 
*p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
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Bias BSH MJH 
Same Party 0.628 -0.417 0.77 0.627 
 (0.43) (1.0) (0.50) (0.70) 
 
Female -1.08* -0.894 -1.0** -2.43** 
 (0.42) (.70) (0.43) (0.70) 
 
Nonwhite -0.114 -1.04 0.03 0.35 
 (0.51) (0.83) (0.51) (0.50) 
 
Republican -0.852 -1.9 -0.848 -0.84 
 (0.44) (1.0) (0.44) (0.44) 
 
Disagree   -0.424  
 
 
 (0.26)  
 
Agree 0.643***   0.219 
 (0.17)   (0.28) 
 
Same Party * Rep 
 
-0.8 -0.022  
 
 (1.6) (0.25)  
 




 -0.1  
 
 
 (0.11)  
 
Same Party * Agree    0.011 
    (0.33) 
 
Female * Agree    0.792* 
    (0.33) 
High Consensus (0/1) 0.061    
 (0.46)    
     
 
Constant 6.21*** 8.95*** 7.63*** 6.97*** 




standard error in an ANOVA framework. The second reason I use multivariate regression 
is that it allows me to control possible confounding variables. 
Hypothesis 1 states that ingroup bias will occur when no moral argument is made. 
To test this hypothesis, I used a dummy variable for whether the participant and their 
partner were in the same political party. Participants’ gender, race, and political party 
were included as controls. The results are listed in the Table 4.1’s second column labelled 
‘ingroup bias.’ The coefficient for political party and its interaction with ingroup status 
were not significant (not shown), indicating that ingroup-bias for both Democrats and 
Republicans was measured at similar levels. Ingroup status was the sole significant 
(p<.01) predictor of attitudes in the model. The positive and significant coefficient 
supports hypothesis 1’s claims about ingroup biased attitudes in the absence of a moral 
argument.  
Hypothesis 2a states that agreement on a moral stance will increase ratings of the 
stance-taker. I use the Likert scale of agreement (0-3) to assess how level of agreement 
impacts attitudinal ratings of stance takers. Consistent with MJH, Table 4.1’s MJH Agree 
column shows the linear effect of moral agreement is highly significant (p<0.001) and 
positive. Specifically, the coefficient shows that for each 1 unit increase in agreement, the 
attitude ratings of the stance taker increase by 0.824. Similarly, Table 4.1’s MJH disagree 
shows disagreement is highly significant (p<0.001) and negative. For each 1 unit increase 
in disagreement, the attitude ratings of the stance taker decrease by 0.85. 
In both models, ingroup bias is non-significant. When moral stances are 
introduced, ingroup bias no longer influences attitudes. Therefore, ingroup status does not 
affect ratings of a partner’s trustworthiness outside of the control conditions. Put another 
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way, when a participant read a moral argument from their partner, the only predictor of 
their attitudes towards that partner was how much they agreed with the stance. When a 
moral stance was taken, politics were not related to the ratings participants gave their 
partners. These findings show support for both of MJH’s claims. 
Next, Hypothesis 3 predicts that moral disagreement with ingroup members will 
have a greater decrease in attitudes when compared to moral disagreement with outgroup 
members. The BSH column of Table 4.1 shows that moral disagreement has a large, 
highly significant (p<.001), negative effect on attitudes. Importantly for hypothesis 3, the 
interaction between moral disagreement and ingroup is non-significant (p=0.33). 
Therefore, I find that moral disagreement did not affect ratings more (or less) for ingroup 
members than outgroup members. This does not reflect the predictions of the black sheep 
hypothesis, so hypothesis 3 is not supported. 
Hypothesis-testing for behavior 
So far, the outcome variable has been attitudes: how trustworthy, responsible, 
moral, non-selfish, fair, and likeable participants rate their partners. The next step is to 
change the focus from attitudes to behavioral trust as measured by how many tokens 
participants gave to their partner in a one-shot trust game. The first question is, like 
above, is there evidence for ingroup bias in behavioral trust? Table 4.2 shows the models 
with behavior as the outcome variable. Looking at the second column labelled ‘ingroup 
bias’ shows that ingroup status and all the controls fail to reach significance at the p<0.05 
level. This stands in contrast to the findings on attitudes reported above. Therefore, even 
though participants report more positive attitudes towards ingroup members when no 
moral stance was taken (control condition), they do not entrust more tokens to their own 
party members.  
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Next, are ingroup members punished more harshly for moral disagreements via 
decreased giving in the trust game? The ‘BSH’ column shows that both the main effect of 
disagreement and its interaction with ingroup status are non-significant predictors of 
giving behavior. A significant negative effect of female gender was found (p<0.05) 
suggesting that females trusted their partners less than their male counterparts, a finding 
consistent with the literature on gender and trust (Buchan et al. 2008; Simpson and van 
Vugt 2009). Additionally, Republican status is marginally significant and negative 
(p=0.057) suggesting less trusting behavior by Republican participants. It is important to 
note that these effects were not present in the control condition, suggesting that these 
variables are only relevant to the decision of how many tokens to entrust a partner when 
that partner has taken a moral stance. 
Lastly, looking at agreement’s effect on giving in ‘MJH’ column shows a non-
significant main effect, but a significant interaction with gender. Female gender also has 
a highly significant negative effect on giving in the model. In combination, these 
coefficients show that females give less than males when they disagree with their partners 
but the gap in giving between them decreases and ultimately disappears once they fully 
agree with their partner. To illustrate this effect, Fig. 4.1 graphs the relationship between 
gender and agreement on number of tokens given to their partner. 
In whole, the behavioral data appears to tell a different story from the attitude results 
reported above. Participants don’t trust others with their tokens differently based on their 
agreement or disagreement with their argument. Additionally, their ingroup status also 
failed to predict giving behavior. Overall, partner characteristics failed to  
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Fig. 4.1: Giving by gender 
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predict giving behavior, even though they succeeded at predicting attitudes towards the 
partner, which included a measure of trustworthiness. 
Moderation analysis 
 I now return to the measure of political extremism that was discussed above. I 
measured political extremism by calculating the average distance from the midpoint each 
participant was on both social and economic matters. The measure ranged from 0 to 4, 
where 0 equals complete moderates, and 4 represents the most partisan individuals. This 
measure of extremism does not separate extreme liberals from conservatives, though they 
are separated in the models below using political party as a dummy variable. I 
hypothesized that extremism would moderate, and specifically amplify, the effects of 
ingroup bias.  
Extremism and attitudes 
 First, does the level of political extremism amplify ingroup bias for attitudes? 
Table 4.3, column 1 shows the effect of introducing extremism into the model for control 
conditions. As a reminder, these participants did not make or see a moral stance, instead 
they read and wrote a short restaurant review. In these conditions, all the variables in the 
attitudinal model fail to reach significance. This non-significance is surprisingly 
considering the significant effect that ingroup status had on attitudes without including 
extremism in the model. Nevertheless, extremism did not moderate ingroup bias’s effect 
on attitudes in the control condition.  
The control conditions do not support extremism’s status as a moderator of ingroup bias, 
but now I look at its effect when a moral stance is being taken. Table 4.3’s second 
column shows that extremism has a significant negative effect on attitudes and interacts 
with both agreement and ingroup status. This is the first evidence we have that extremism 
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Table 4.3: Extremism and Attitudes 
 Ingroup Bias  Agree  Disagree 
Same Party (0/1) 0.859 -0.483 -0.142 
 (0.54) (0.26) (0.28) 
 
Female (0/1) -0.015 0.107 0.181 
 (.26) (0.12) (0.13) 
 
Nonwhite (0/1) -0.232 -0.177 -0.163 
 (0.83) (0.14) (0.15) 
 
Republican (0/1) 0.273 0.238* 0.199 
 (0.32) (0.12) (0.13) 
 
Extremism (0/4) -0.17 -0.324*** -0.035 




  (0.11)  
Disagree   -0.836*** 
   (0.15) 
 
 
Same Party * Extremism -0.017 0.201* 0.088 
 (0.18) (0.09) (0.10) 
 
Same Party * Agree 0.074*  
  (0.04)  
 
Same Party * Disagree   -0.006 
   (0.05) 
 
Constant 5.00*** 4.44*** 6.97*** 
 (0.48) (0.28) (0.63) 
    
    
 
 
*p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
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is acting as a moderator, and it is significantly amplifying the effects of two variables of 
interest. The first interaction shows that political extremism increases the effect of 
ingroup bias on ratings when a moral argument is made. The second interaction shows 
that extremism amplifies the effect that agreement on a moral stance has on ratings of a 
partner. In other words, as extremist beliefs increase the effect of moral agreement on 
attitudes also increases.  
With promising results from the moral stance agreement conditions, we should 
expect extremism to have similar if not greater impact when participants disagree with 
the moral stance. However, extremism has no effects, direct or indirect, in the 
disagreement model. Table 4.3’s third column shows that the disagreement model has no 
significant effects other than the main effect of disagreement on attitudes. 
The results change when the outcome variable is giving behavior. Once again, we 
turn to the control condition. Column 1 of Table 4.4 shows that extremism has a 
significant (p=0.05) negative direct effect on giving, but extremism did not moderate 
ingroup bias in the control condition for giving or attitudes. When no moral stance was 
taken, more extreme partisans sent fewer tokens to their partners regardless of their 
partner’s political status. Ingroup status also decreased giving to politically similar 
others, which was an unexpected finding. Lastly, Republicans gave fewer tokens, though 
this did not interact with extremism.  
Moving to the moral stance conditions, we see similar findings that I discussed 
above when the outcome variable was attitudinal. First, when participants agreed with a 
moral stance extremism decreased giving, as it did in the control condition. Extremism 
increased the impact of agreement on behavioral trust. This mirrors the effects found in 
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Table 4.4: Extremism and Giving 
 Ingroup Bias  Agree  Disagree 
Same Party (0/1) -2.86* 0.182 0.241 
 (1.42) (0.95) (0.97) 
 
Female (0/1) -0.88 -1.01* -0.938* 
 (.69) (0.43) (0.43) 
 
Nonwhite (0/1) -0.998 -0.02 -0.010 
 (0.82) (0.50) (0.51) 
 
Republican (0/1) -2.25** -0.788 -0.82 
 (0.85) (0.44) (0.45) 
 
Extremism (0/4) -0.65 -0.767* -0.090 
 (0.33) (0.34) (0.28) 
 
Agree  -0.21  
  (0.39)  
Disagree   0.064 
   (0.53) 
 
 
Same Party * Extremism 0.85 0.17 00135 
 (0.48) (0.35) (0.35) 
 
Agree * Extremism 0.31*  
  (0.14)  
 
Disagree * Extremism   -0.184 
   (0.17) 
 
Constant 10.8*** 8.40*** 7.91*** 
 (1.26) (1.05) (0.85) 
    
    
 
 
*p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
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the attitudinal data of Table 4.3. Next, when we look at moral disagreement, we see that 
many variables of interest lose significance. Disagreement itself has no effect on giving 
behavior as well as extremism and political party of self and other. Lastly, in the moral 
stance conditions, females gave significantly fewer tokens to their partners than their 
male counterparts.  
Overall, we see that in both the attitudinal and behavioral models, extremism only 
acted as a moderator when there was moral agreement. The behavior model shows that 
political extremism leads participants to give less as a baseline but amplifies the effect of 
agreement on tokens given.  
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Chapter 5: Discussion 
This research presents key findings that help illustrate the underlying processes 
behind the lack of trust in and cooperation between Democrats and Republicans. It 
analyzes potential factors behind the large political trust gap in modern-day America 
using an online experimental setting. Specifically, this paper examines how group 
membership and moral agreement interact to affect perceptions of morality and 
trustworthiness. This research tested predictions derived from social identity theory, the 
black sheep hypothesis, and the moral judgements hypothesis and illustrated the 
conditions under which shared morals can outweigh ‘outgroup hate’ and when moral 
disagreement can outweigh ‘ingroup love.’  
 Results from measures of attitudinal trust supported predictions from SIT on 
ingroup bias. In the control condition, where no moral stances were taken, both 
Democrats and Republicans rated members of their own party as higher on a scale 
consisting of liking, trustworthiness, responsible, moral, unselfish, and fairness. This 
ingroup bias effect was no longer present when a moral stance was taken. Additionally, 
the absence of ingroup biased attitudes when moral stances are taken supports recent 
findings that offering additional information about an interaction partner can outweigh 
parochialism (Hernandez-Lagos & Minor, 2015; Vermue, Meleady, & Seger, 2019). 
These findings also supported MJH’s predictions that agreement or disagreement 
on a moral stance leads to increased ratings of trust and morality. Agreement or 
disagreement with the moral stance were the only significant predictors of feelings 
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towards the stance-taker. This is consistent with prior findings that moral disagreement is 
the main mechanism behind partisan prejudice (Viciana et al. 2019). This effect was 
consistent regardless of whether the argument was characterized by high consensus 
(cheating is bad) or low consensus (prolife or prochoice arguments).  
No support was found for the black sheep hypothesis. Results did not show 
evidence of increased negative attitudes or a decrease in trusting behavior when 
participants disagreed with an ingroup member when compared to outgroup 
disagreement. Instead, when a moral stance was taken ingroup status had no significant 
effects, neither direct nor indirectly through agreement, on attitudes. Therefore, 
agreement or disagreement’s effect on view of stance-takers did not differ when the 
stance-taker was an ingroup or an outgroup member. This supports the argument above 
that when a moral stance is taken, agreement or disagreement with the stance is the sole 
determinant of attitudes towards the stance-taker and other factors no longer matter. 
While the attitude results listed above are mainly consistent with predictions, the 
behavioral data were largely non-significant. In this study, the giving behavior did not 
support any of the hypotheses and the only significant predictors of giving behavior 
found were participant gender, political orientation, and political extremism. While there 
are mixed findings on political identity’s role in trust and reciprocity via economic games 
(Hernandez-Lagos & Minor, 2015; Anderson, Mellor, & Milyo 2004; Wu et al. 2018) 
most published studies find evidence for ingroup favoritism (Balliet et al. 2018; Fowler & 
Kam, 2007; Van Lange et al. 2012; Carlin & Love, 2016; Iyengar & Westwood, 2014; 
Carlin & Love, 2013). This suggests that giving behavior is determined by a different 
mechanism than the ones outlined in this paper that accurately predicted attitudes, 
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including ratings of another’s trustworthiness. Ultimately, the only significant predictors 
of giving behavior were participant-level variables. In summary, the choice of how much 
to trust another was based more on the one doing the trusting, than the recipient of that 
trust. 
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Chapter 6: Future Directions and Concluding Remarks 
 This project is the first in a research agenda focused on discovering the conditions 
where outgroup cooperation is possible. Using this project as a foundation, future projects 
could look at how repeated interactions with an outgroup member can build trust and 
overcome the partisan trust gap seen in the attitude measures. Additionally, future 
projects will focus on extending the current research to test if trust can be established in 
one-shot experiments and translated to future economic games with other outgroup 
members. This will answer the question, does the trust and liking established from 
agreeing with a moral stance generalize to the outgroup as a whole? Relatedly, does 
agreement with outgroup members cause participants to believe that the outgroup is more 
similar to their ingroup as a whole? 
 In modern-day America, we see an increasing gap between Democrats and 
Republicans. I find that politically opposed people can overcome partisan-biased attitudes 
towards each other by emphasizing their moral similarities rather than their differences. 
However, I also find that political extremism increases the trust gap by amplifying the 
effects of ingroup bias and decreasing behavioral trust across all domains. Americans are 
becoming increasingly ideological, so this finding should serve as a cautionary look into 
a potential future where citizens are even more distrusting of one another than they are 
currently. A beneficial next step would be to create more instances where people relate 
with politically different others over their similarities. This will expand the ingroup to be 
inclusive of all Americans, rather than only half of them. 
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